CVE-2010-1885
OS Command Injection in The MPC::HexToNum function in helpctr
Executive Summary
CVE-2010-1885 is a unknown severity vulnerability affecting appsec. It is classified as OS Command Injection. Ensure your systems and dependencies are patched immediately to mitigate exposure risks.
Precogs AI Insight
"The Microsoft Help and Support Center (helpctr.exe) contains a remote code execution vulnerability via the HCP protocol. Attackers trick users into clicking a crafted `hcp://` link, executing malicious commands with the user's privileges. Precogs Binary SAST uncovers unsafe URL handler implementations."
What is this vulnerability?
CVE-2010-1885 is categorized as a unknown OS Command Injection flaw. Based on our vulnerability intelligence, this issue occurs when the application fails to securely handle untrusted data boundaries.
The MPC::HexToNum function in helpctr.exe in Microsoft Windows Help and Support Center in Windows XP and Windows Server 2003 does not properly handle malformed escape sequences, which allows remote attackers to bypass the trusted documents whitelist (fromHCP option) and execute arbitrary commands via a crafted hcp:// URL, aka "Help Center URL Validation Vulnerability."
This architectural defect enables adversaries to bypass intended security controls, directly manipulating the application's execution state or data layer. Immediate strategic intervention is required.
Risk Assessment
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| CVSS Base Score | 0 (UNKNOWN) |
| Vector String | N/A |
| Published | June 15, 2010 |
| Last Modified | April 11, 2025 |
| Related CWEs | CWE-78 |
Impact on Systems
✅ Data Exfiltration: Attackers can extract sensitive data from backend databases, configuration files, or internal services.
✅ Authentication Bypass: Exploiting this flaw may allow unauthorized access to protected resources and administrative interfaces.
✅ Lateral Movement: Once initial access is gained, attackers can pivot to internal systems and escalate privileges.
How to Fix and Mitigate CVE-2010-1885
- Apply Vendor Patches: Upgrade affected components to their latest, non-vulnerable versions immediately.
- Implement Input Validation: Ensure all user-supplied data is validated, sanitized, and type-checked before processing.
- Deploy Runtime Protection: Use Precogs continuous monitoring to detect exploitation attempts in real time.
- Audit Dependencies: Review and update all third-party libraries and transitive dependencies.
Defending with Precogs AI
The Microsoft Help and Support Center (helpctr.exe) contains a remote code execution vulnerability via the HCP protocol. Attackers trick users into clicking a crafted hcp:// link, executing malicious commands with the user's privileges. Precogs Binary SAST uncovers unsafe URL handler implementations.
Use Precogs to continuously scan your codebase, binaries, APIs, and infrastructure for this vulnerability class and related attack patterns. Our AI-powered detection engine combines static analysis with threat intelligence to identify exploitable weaknesses before attackers do.
Vulnerability Code Signature
Attack Data Flow
| Stage | Detail |
|---|---|
| Source | User-supplied system argument |
| Vector | Argument appended to a shell command string |
| Sink | child_process.exec() or similar OS execution sink |
| Impact | Remote Code Execution (RCE), full system compromise |
Vulnerable Code Pattern
// ❌ VULNERABLE: OS command injection
const { exec } = require('child_process');
function pingHost(host) {
// Taint sink: unvalidated host string executed in shell
exec('ping -c 4 ' + host, (error, stdout, stderr) => {
console.log(stdout);
});
}
Secure Code Pattern
// ✅ SECURE: ExecFile with parameter arrays
const { execFile } = require('child_process');
function pingHost(host) {
// Sanitized execution: arguments passed safely, bypassing shell interpolation
execFile('ping', ['-c', '4', host], (error, stdout, stderr) => {
console.log(stdout);
});
}
How Precogs Detects This
Precogs AI Analysis Engine natively intercepts unsafe OS command execution sinks, ensuring all arguments are properly separated from the execution context.\n